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Markets and states are often seen as opposites, but in practice they are frequently 
intertwined. Sometimes states even create markets in order to serve public interests. A recent 
example of this is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was set up 
to combat the climate change that threatens the capacity of the environment to fulfil the 
needs of present and future generations. The objective of the EU ETS as a policy instrument is 
the reduction of CO2 emissions in EU member states in a cost effective way. The central 
research question addressed in this paper is to what extent and how the implementation of 
the EU ETS in the Netherlands stimulates participants to serve public interests. The paper is 
based on an empirical study of the implementation of the EU ETS in the Netherlands. The 
paper summarizes the stakeholder perspectives on the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU 
ETS in serving public interests.  
 
The implementation of the EU ETS has led to the creation of a wholly new market, and has 
brought CO2 as a key issue into the board room of many corporations. Its effectiveness in 
terms of CO2 emissions reduction is still largely an unfulfilled promise. The implementation 
of the EU ETS shows that the creation of an effective and efficient market requires a huge 
effort, by both public and private actors, and that its effects are highly unpredictable and 







The Community and its Member States have agreed to fulfil their commitments to reduce 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol jointly, in accordance 
with Decision 2002/358/EC. This Directive aims to contribute to fulfilling the commitments of 
the European Community and its Member States more effectively, through an efficient 
European market in greenhouse gas emission allowances, with the least possible diminution 
of economic development and employment.  
(Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003) 
 
In 2005, the European Union implemented the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) in order to meet (a part of) the emissions reduction targets agreed under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Following the Kyoto recommendations, the ETS took the form of a cap and trade 
CO2 emissions market constructed by the EU and implemented by its member states. This cap
and trade system sets an absolute quantity limit (cap) on the total CO2 emissions of the 
participating installations (power stations and energy intensive industrial plants) over a 
defined period. This quantity of emissions allowances is allocated among the participants, 
which then trade allowances between each other. The goal of this policy instrument is to 
reduce CO2 emissions in the EU member states in a cost effective way,1 with the least possible 
reduction in employment.  
 
Emissions markets, and carbon markets in particular, are a prime example of markets based 
on economic theory, and can be seen as an ongoing experiment in marketization (Callon 
2009; MacKenzie 2009). Economic theory provides both rationale and guidance. Market 
failure with respect to environmental externalities (a key element of welfare theory) provides 
the rationale for government intervention (Pigou 1920). Market design theory provides the 
tools for constructing this market, internalizing environmental externalities into market 
transactions (Cramton & Kerr 2002; Cramton 2009; McMillan 2003). The underlying 
‘fundamental science’ rationale is the mitigation of climate change and its devastating impact 
on humanity (Hepburn & Stern 2008), usually in other places and at other (future) times 
than the actors that cause this climate change.  
 
Although the theory of emissions markets has been well described, the design and 
implementation of the EU ETS is both highly ambitious and uncertain due to its 
unprecedented size and scope. The initial design and development of the ETS have been 
extensively described and analysed (see e.g. Sijm 2009; Ellerman et al. 2010). Nonetheless, 
there is a dearth of insights into the actual implementation and effects of the ETS. The central 
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research question addressed in this paper is to what extent and how the implementation of 
the EU ETS in the Netherlands stimulates participants to serve public interests. The objective 
of this paper is to improve the insight into the way markets do or do not serve public 
interests. Public interests are defined as the interests of all those who are affected by 
transactions in which they do not participate, to such an extent that it is deemed necessary 
for those consequences to be systematically addressed (Dewey 1927). In the case of the EU 
ETS, the ultimate (normative) public interest is the maintenance of the capacity of the 
environment to fulfil the needs of present and future generations,2 while the instrumental 
goals are (1) the reduction of CO2 emissions in the EU member states (2) in a cost effective 
way,3 under the condition of a minimal reduction in employment. These two instrumental 
goals are connected by design rather than default; the reduction of CO2 emissions to the ‘20 
per cent by 2020’ target could also be realized via taxes on pollution, or subsidies for clean 
technologies. The fundamental (normative) market failure rationales also differ: for the first 
instrumental goal the rationale involves the internalization of externalities, while for the 
second instrumental goal it entails the installation of an information discovery mechanism 
(i.e. setting up a market) to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources (solving 
problems of information asymmetries). In between these instrumental goals and the 
fundamental public interest served are many other private and public interests (cf. Skodvin et 
al. 2010). In addition to the study of the instrumental and normative aspects of the EU ETS, 
we will also deal with the positive (i.e. descriptive) aspects, by showing how policy is shaped 
by different interest groups.  
 
The paper is based on an empirical study of the implementation of the EU ETS in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands is neither a big nor a small player in the EU ETS. It contains all 
relevant participants in terms of the industries and intermediaries involved, but the core 
stakeholders still comprise a relatively small group. In 2009 the Netherlands was ranked 7th 
within the EU in terms of ETS emissions. Even though the ETS is dominated by the European 
Commission, national stakeholders have some degree of policy freedom, and there have been 
country specific conditions for industrial sectors and the government. The focus on one 
country as a case provides useful information about the different perspectives of a limited 
number of participants on the same issues. We interviewed relevant stakeholders, ranging 
from policymakers implementing the scheme to companies affected by the scheme and 
intermediaries such as researchers, consultants, traders, bankers and lawyers.4 In addition, 
we have taken into account the relevant academic literature on the implementation of the EU 
ETS, as far as this is relevant for the Dutch context.  
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This paper summarizes the stakeholder perspectives on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
EU ETS in serving public interests. The paper is structured as follows. First, we focus on the 
legitimacy of the scheme among participants and the reach of the scheme. Next we turn to 
the question how these participants interpret the public interests to be accomplished. After 
the focus on the public interest, we describe the perceived general quality of market design 
and regulation, including perceived design controversies. In terms of outcomes, we focus on 
the distributional effects and the asymmetries and public policy problems observed by 




2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
2.1 Legitimacy and reach 
One of most appealing observations is that all respondents regard cap and trade as the 
superior mechanism for achieving emission reduction goals. Contrary to the academic 
discussion, where the comparison between taxes and cap and trade is still ongoing and the 
position of taxes appears to be strong (e.g. Nordhaus 2007), our respondents considered the 
ETS to be the superior system. As one of the interviewees put it: ‘allowances are business; tax 
is merely a transfer’. The ETS enjoys strong legitimacy among participants; they assume that 
the system will be in place until at least 2020.5 This does not mean that all respondents agree 
upon all parts and intentions of the ETS – some even question the possibility of regional 
climate action – but all of them consider cap and trade to be the least harmful.  
 
Closely connected to its legitimacy is the reach of the ETS. One of our interviewees stated that, 
‘the ETS introduced CO2 emissions into the boardroom’. All participants consider allowances 
to be an essential commodity and follow market developments accordingly. Initially some 
mainly expected asset backed trading, but volumes expanded rapidly.6 Far beyond 
compliance levels, firms incorporate carbon prices into market and risk analyses. Energy 
companies include carbon prices in their ‘green and dark spread’7 and therefore in their fuel 
switch decision; energy intensive companies incorporate futures in investment decisions; 
and traders select positions based on expected price movements. Stocks of Phase II 
allowances are an important strategic asset for the Phase III period, and during the recession 
allowances provided additional liquidity flows, as firms were over allocated. 
 
In line with discussions in the academic literature (Abrell et al. 2011; Anderson & Di Maria 
2011; Ellerman & Buchner 2008; Sandoff & Schaad 2009), opinions about effective 
abatement vary8. For Phase I, interviewees reported a fuel switch from coal to gas as a 
consequence of the ETS, and for Phase II reduced emissions as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. For the remainder of Phase II, most expect a modest net short position.  
 
The instrumental goal of the EU ETS has always been the reduction of CO2 emissions in a cost
effective way. To what extent have CO2 emissions been reduced to date in the Netherlands? 
There was no net decrease in the level of realized (verified) CO2 emissions in the Netherlands 
over the period 2005 20099, but that can be partly explained by an expansion in the number 
of installations joining the scheme. Several interviewees stated that the EU ETS has had no 
additional impact on the realized emissions, and that the macroeconomic crisis has probably 
had the biggest impact during the implementation of the EU ETS thus far. The numbers clearly 
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do not show a downward trend in the level of emissions during Phase I and Phase II of the EU 
ETS in the Netherlands (however, this is due partly to the extended scope of the scheme in 
2008 and 2009). The EU policy goal is a 21 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions in Europe 
over the period 2005 2020. The Dutch policy goal – according to the Dutch policy document 
‘Schoon en Zuinig’ (‘Clean and Efficient’) – for national emissions (including non ETS) is 
more ambitious, with a planned reduction of 30 per cent in the period 1990 2020.10 A recent 
report by the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (ECN and PBL 2010) concludes that this target will not be reached with 
the current instruments in the Netherlands: including proposed policy measures, the 
estimated greenhouse gas reduction will amount to 16 24 per cent in 2020 relative to 1990.  
 
2.2 The Government’s Role in the ETS 
Despite the broad consensus about the general goal of the ETS, participants seem to have 
different ideas about the operational design and the government’s role in the market. 
Following the cap and trade terminology, the government should set the cap while the 
participants perform the trade. Some support this view; they demand some improvements in 
operational aspects (verification, registration, accounting rules) but expect the government to 
restrict itself to the provision of a properly functioning trading system. They emphasize that 
the essential feature of the ETS is not the transfer payment but the restricted cap. The price is 
simply the outcome of the process. A low price indicates a low abatement cost, without 
jeopardizing emission reduction levels. Current low emission levels provide businesses with 
the opportunity to accumulate allowances for the future or afford them some liquidity for the 
present.  
 
Some interviewees, however, expect government to go beyond the functioning of the market 
and to take a view on the outcome of the market. Since they consider the ETS to be the driver 
for abatement and innovation, carbon prices should be ‘meaningful’, which is certainly not 
the situation at current spot prices, and still too weak at future prices. The ETS authorities 
would be expected to provide minimum prices (for instance through allowance auctions) or 
withdraw allowances from the market in the event of (current) over allocation. There are 
even calls for an allowance banking facility, i.e. a financial authority that would protect the 
stability of carbon prices and take appropriate action if market conditions threaten stability. 
These kinds of interventions are especially appealing in the light of the current (financial) 
crisis, with production levels far below trend lines and corresponding prices.  
 
Logically, most positions taken on this issue can be explained by the potential benefits that 
the carbon markets could provide to different participants. Those on a long or trading 
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position tend to favour an expansion of the role of the government, while those on short 
positions tend to favour the current model of limited government intervention. Views among 
government officials and other participants are mixed, mainly depending on their employer’s 
or their personal view on climate policy. 
 
2.3 Quality of Market Design and Regulation 
Recognizing the amount of work done within a few years by a very limited number of actors, 
most of the interviewees expressed their respect for the general quality of the European and 
national design and regulation. Some of the problems that have been extensively reported are 
considered to be faits accomplis that inevitably accompany the market design. This holds for 
the over allocation in Phase I, the accounting problems,11 CER double counting,12 VAT fraud, 
some verification problems and the occurrence of windfall profits. The phishing and recent 
theft issues can probably be ranked among the same reactions. Participants accept the 
inevitable learning curve and the need for additional regulation. However, they expect 
prompt government action in future situations. In the case of VAT fraud, respondents 
perceived satisfactory government action (at least for the Netherlands); as regards the 
accounting issues, some problems persist.  
 
Some of the interviewees saw the problem as being an underestimation of the importance of 
carbon trading and of the powerful market participants involved. The ETS has successfully 
created a new commodity, even a financial instrument. Trading volumes are far beyond 
compliance levels; exchange markets provide the facilities for spot trading; and criminals 
have also discovered the liquidity of the market. Furthermore, market information has not 
been disseminated as it should have been in the case of financial market information. These 
issues might call for a market authority that has the legitimacy to monitor and supervise the 
primary and secondary carbon markets, possibly by strengthening the NEa (Dutch Emission 
Authority), relocating the responsibilities to the AFM (Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets), or establishing a centralized European market authority.  
 
2.4 Market Design Controversies 
Despite the recognition of the general quality of the ETS framework, some issues are subject 
to continuing debate and controversy. One issue on which interviewees hold rather different 
but strong opinions is the New Entrants Reserve (NER), the allowance reservation for new 
installations and the expansion of existing installations. While some interviewees favour a 
restriction on the NER, the AEII (2011) calls for ‘equal treatment of new entrants and 
incumbents’ and demands full access of new manufacturing plants to the NER.  
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Of the two fundamental causes of price volatility (Fankhauser & Hepburn 2010), the market
induced price volatility has certainly been experienced by the interviewees. As carbon prices 
are highly correlated with the coal and gas markets, which in turn are connected to economic 
and natural developments, these fluctuations are substantial but transparent, as participants 
confirm. The second volatility is that which results from flawed market design. In contrast to 
the extensive academic literature on the problem of price volatility (Alberola et al. 2008; 
Ellerman & Joskow 2008; Fankhauser & Hepburn 2010), the interviewees did not mention 
price volatility as being particularly disruptive (any more). One interviewee stated that 
carbon is considered in risk analyses to be a commodity like gas and oil, with comparable 
price volatility.  
 
The interviewees agreed that there have been some elements of flawed market design, but 
disagreed about the extent of the volatility. The over allocation during Phase I is one such 
element; some see it as the manifestation of industry rent seeking, others as the inevitable 
consequence of a new market design. The accounting issue and the consequences of criminal 
activities could also be added to the list. The firms involved recognize elements of ‘flawed 
market design’, while government officials recognize the unavoidable constraints needed to 
safeguard the robustness of the system. Some interviewees also mentioned the risk of 
interfering climate or energy standards. A view espoused by some and opposed by others is 
that a specific standard for new energy plants disrupts the ETS. The same could hold for 
subsidies to firms or projects that are part of the scheme. 
 
2.5 Distributional Effects 
Distributional effects refer to the actual and potential profits and losses that firms and 
consumers experience through the ETS. The most notable issue in this respect are windfall 
profits. None of the interviewees seem to have been surprised by the occurrence of this 
phenomenon; they have perhaps been more surprised by the negative political and media 
attention. Most recognize the principle that as carbon is a commodity, its value should be 
considered as a cost of production. The question, however, is to what extent producers pass 
on these costs to consumers. For the power sector, most assume that this has happened, but 
for the energy intensive industry this is highly disputed. In 2005, an ECN report concluded 
that energy producers pass on carbon prices to customers. In 2010, CE Delft reached the same 
conclusion for the energy intensive industry (De Bruijn et al. 2010). However, immediately 
after the publication of this conclusion, a NERA (2010) report disputed the econometric 
analysis of the CE Delft report. The CE Delft study was commissioned by The European 
Climate Foundation, the NERA report by Cefic, Eurofer and Europia (European associations 
for energy intensive industries). 
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Most interviewees, however, do not consider windfall profits to be a major problem. In the 
end, the polluter (polluting consumer) pays, though most would argue that in the case of 
windfall profits, free allocation based on grandfathering should be replaced by an auction 
system. Some interviewees do refer to the wealth redistribution that occurs. As the power 
sector is short and in a position to pass on the costs to the customers, while the energy
intensive industry is mostly long, there is an actual wealth redistribution from consumers to 
the energy intensive industry. Consumers do not really seem to have noticed this – yet – but 
it could potentially harm the public legitimacy of the scheme in the longer term.  
 
More than windfall profits, the concern about carbon leakage13 is generally accepted; all 
interviewees acknowledged the importance of avoiding the relocation of production. We did 
not learn of any actual leakage, though representatives of industries did certainly 
acknowledge that at higher carbon prices some intermediate goods might be imported or 
some parts of production might be relocated to a foreign subsidiary.  
 
2.6 Asymmetries and Public Policy 
From a theoretical point of view, the transformation of the national cap to allocation 
schedules is a purely technical operation (e.g. Fankhauser & Hepburn 2010). Stakeholders 
did not however perceive this as such. More important, we understood that information 
asymmetry, rent seeking, lobbying, established positions and opinions certainly do influence 
the actual outcome. During the policymaking process of determining the installations to be 
covered under the ETS, their initial emission levels, and the distribution of emission 
allowances among them, firms will mobilize resources to seize opportunities and seek to 
accumulate rents. We noticed a huge variety of activities by firms to influence policymaking: 
study group participation, corporate letters to the EC or national authorities, letters from 
corporate alliances, position papers, reports by research institutes, personal contacts with 
politicians, personal contacts with civil servants, etcetera. As firms have strong interests in 
the ETS (a minor system change could have an effect to the tune of millions of euro’s for an 
individual firm), it is worthwhile from the firm’s perspective to dedicate resources to lobby 
activities.14 This ‘public choice problem’ might undermine public interests (cf. Kasper 2007; 
Hanley & MacKenzie 2010). The reverse problem might also hold; if government officials and 
their advisors have some preconceived ideas and positions about certain sectors, those 
sectors could experience deteriorated distributional effects. 
 
Not surprisingly, our interviewees reported both asymmetries. On the one hand, government 
officials do indeed experience strong lobby activities from firms. On the other hand, we were 
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told that government officials were fixed in their ideas and not willing to accept reasonable 
criticism on flawed market design.  
 
From both government and corporate perspectives, we noted that participants are strongly 
influenced by and connected to discussions at European level. As was illustrated for windfall 
profits in the section on distributional effects, there is an ongoing political struggle between 
environmental lobby groups on the one hand and representatives of the European energy
intensive industries on the other. Environmental groups, together with some energy 
producers and institutional investors, lobby for a 30 per cent target, adjustment of caps to 
take account of historical emissions and restriction of offsets. Industry federations, for their 
part, lobby for the 20 per cent target, committed caps, ex post allocation, extended new 
entrant permits and attention for the carbon leakage risk. Participants in the Netherlands are 
very aware of the European discussion, take part in it and often reflect on it.  
 
These public choice problems induce a certain tension between stakeholders, both between 
incumbents and between incumbents and government officials. Closely related to these 
potential conflicting interests, many interviewees mentioned a discrepancy between the 
knowledge capacity of the government on the one hand and of firms on the other, in terms of 
both numbers and qualifications. The number of employees within firms working on 
ETS( related) issues far outnumbers the government officials concerned with the subject. In 
addition to the numbers, some suggest that in depth knowledge in government circles is 
limited and that consequently the public sector is highly dependent on specialist research 
institutes for policy. Some make no mention of the knowledge discrepancies but observe a 
certain tendency towards conservatism. While firms require dynamic adjustments, the public 
sector tends to be rather risk averse and prefers to limit the number and scope of 
adaptations.15  
 
Adding to the participants’ public choice problems, stakeholders reflected on the problems 
relating to the public legitimacy of the scheme. Many observed that the complexity of the ETS 
presents substantial difficulties in communicating all details of the scheme to the general 
public. Combined with the often negative news about the scheme, this poses a threat to the 
public legitimacy of the scheme, and ultimately to its political viability. It is interesting to 
note that this concern was not shared by all interviewees. The windfall profits issue is one of 
the most striking cases; while most interviewees suggested that these profits are economically 
justifiable, only a few reflected on the public and political consequences. Obviously, some see 
the scheme as a rather closed setting, while some recognize the political environment in 
which it operates.  
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2.7 The Future of the EU ETS 
Reflecting on Phase III of the EU ETS, most interviewees recognized improvements in terms of 
the expansion of the scheme, the harmonization of regulation and allocation (creating a level 
playing field within Europe), the introduction of benchmarking allocation, and the extension 
of auctioning. We observed mixed opinions about the carbon leakage list.16 Many considered 
the list to be too long and the criteria too obscure, and saw this as the result of national and 
sectoral rent seeking efforts. Others stated that even for listed installations, permits will only 
be distributed in relation to the stringent sector benchmarks. Furthermore, these 
installations will be exposed to energy costs, in which carbon costs have been included. In 
that sense the scheme could still provide the proper incentives for abatement while reducing 
the carbon leakage risk.  
 
Interviewees shared their doubts about the ETS in the post 2020 period. In the absence of 
international climate agreements and the EU 2050 ambitions, the ETS will experience more 
countervailing powers. On the one hand, market participants say that the ETS functions 
properly as a market, but other interest groups claim that the ETS does not lead to an 
additional reduction in CO2 emissions and that it redistributes wealth from consumers to 
energy producers and energy intensive industries. On the other hand, once the price of CO2 
emission rights becomes ‘significant’, the energy intensive industries, and to a lesser extent 
energy producers, will complain that there is no internationally level playing field and that 
they are being hit unfairly, with the potential consequence that they will relocate parts of 
their production to non EU ETS territory. Some interviewees still anticipate global climate 
agreements; some expect a gradual process of bilateral cooperation; some perceive a need for 




3 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this paper was to improve the insight into the way in which markets serve 
public interests. We took the EU ETS as a case in which governments create a market in order 
to combat a public bad, i.e. global warming. To what extent and how does the 
implementation of the EU ETS stimulate its participants to serve public interests? We initially 
distinguished between the ultimate (normative) public interest of the EU ETS (maintenance of 
the capacity of the environment to fulfil the needs of present and future generations) and the 
two main instrumental goals (reduction of CO2 emissions in EU member states in a cost
effective way). The field study for this paper aimed to uncover the role and perspectives of 
key stakeholders in the implementation of the EU ETS in the Netherlands. These stakeholders 
do indeed have rather strong opinions about the EU ETS and the public interests involved. 
Those opinions are a mixture of their personal knowledge and values and the interests of the 
organizations they represent. During the interviews we saw that these opinions have certainly 
influenced the actual implementation of the market. Ultimately, only a relatively small 
number of persons have been involved in actual decision making, and these few persons have 
taken decisions that influenced a multi billion euro market. In general we can conclude that 
these participants – both government officials and other participants – have succeeded in 
creating a totally new market ‘out of the blue’, and in that sense a new market has been 
established. Furthermore, all participants seem to have committed to the new scheme, and 
the carbon market has turned out to be bigger and more dynamic than initially foreseen.  
 
This success also incorporates one of the main implementation problems of the scheme: the 
underestimation of the capacities of market participants and the weakness of governments in 
seeking to reduce unproductive or even destructive behaviour by market participants. 
Looking back at the market developments, market participants seem to have been more 
proactive than government officials expected, not only in terms of criminal activities, but also 
in (future) market trading, passing on costs, accounting matters and lobbying activities. Since 
legislation takes time to establish, government capacity has been limited and public interests 
are not as clear cut as corporate interests, governments seem to have lagged behind market 
developments. 
 
While one could conclude that a new market has been established, it is questionable whether 
the instrumental goal of reducing carbon emissions has been achieved yet. Those who focus 
on this goal conclude that carbon markets have not yet done anything to promote emission 
abatement and require adaptations in the market to improve actual outcomes. This dispute 
between those who focus on market performance and those who focus on market outcome 
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mirrors the public discussion about the scheme in general: participants in the debate hold 
different opinions about the public interest(s) to be served with the EU ETS. In addition, it is 
not clear whether the ETS has accelerated the development and diffusion of new clean 
technologies, and the potential negative effects of the ETS on employment in energy intensive 
industries have been mentioned several times. The debate on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the ETS seems to take place mainly – at least for the Netherlands – among a small group of 
well informed stakeholders. Due to the increased complexity of the ETS it has become more 
and more difficult to communicate the effectiveness and efficiency of the ETS to the broader 
public.  
 
The implementation of the EU ETS shows that the creation of an effective and efficient market 
requires a huge effort by both public and private actors, and that its effects are highly 
unpredictable and necessitate continuous monitoring and interventions in order for public 
interests to be served. Considering the complexity of implementing a new market on this 
scale, the EU has been very prudent in designing an ETS not from scratch, but with two 
‘experimental’ phases before the ultimate Phase III. In that sense, the need for learning has 
been anticipated, and it may be observed that until now the focus has been on how to 
implement the ETS properly and that the hour of truth will come in Phase III, when the ETS 
will cover more industries, will lower the cap substantially and will auction off a considerable 
portion of the emission rights.  
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1  ‘Cost-effective’ refers to the extent to which this policy instrument (i.e. the EU ETS) has achieved or is expected to 
achieve its results at a lower cost compared with alternatives. Shortcomings in cost-effectiveness occur when the policy 
instrument is not the least-cost alternative or approach to achieving the same or similar reductions in CO2 emissions. 
2  If the indirect consequence of the transactions of power plants and energy-intensive producers is a decreased capacity of 
the environment to fulfil the needs of actors not involved in these transactions (e.g. due to climate change), a public 
interest can be recognized and served.  
3  Sometimes not only allocative efficiency is assumed, but also dynamic efficiency, i.e. the development and diffusion of 
new (clean) technologies to improve energy efficiency and/or reduce CO2 emissions.  
4  See Appendix 1 for the list of interviewees. The interviews took place in 2010.  
5  This can be characterized as ‘cognitive closure’: the inability to formulate an alternative perspective on realizing the 
targets set out in the EU ETS (cf. Aalbers et al. 2010 in the financial sector). 
6  In 2005 the European Climate Exchange was established in Amsterdam, providing EUA and CER futures, options and 
spot-trading akin to other commodities. Trading volumes expanded rapidly: from 100 million tonnes of CO2 in 2005 to 5 
billion tonnes in 2009. The development of the ECX illustrates the growth of emissions trading. Meanwhile these kinds of 
exchanges provided the necessary liquidity to reach these levels of transfers, as transactions were limited to Over The 
Counter trading previously.  
7  The dark spread is the theoretical gross margin of a coal-fired power plant from selling a unit of electricity, having 
bought the fuel required to produce that unit of electricity. All other costs (operation and maintenance, capital and other 
financial costs) must be covered from the dark spread (cash streams). A green spread also includes the price of CO2 
emission allowances. 
8  Even more so at the global level; WRR (2006:15; 24) argued that the EU ETS suffers from an effectiveness-contradiction: 
what is achievable is not effective, and an effective policy is not achievable. The small (in a global perspective) number 
of participants cannot develop a globally effective policy without the countries that do not participate in the Kyoto 
agreements (like the US, China and India). 
9  Studies on the overall effect of Phase I of the EU ETS estimate a net abatement of several percentage points compared to a 
business-as-usual scenario (Ellerman & Buchner 2008; Anderson & Di Maria 2011).  
10  However, the Dutch cabinet has retreated to the lower EU ETS goals: “Based on the ETS, the fourth government under 
Prime Minister Balkenende announced a 21% reduction target (relative to 2005) for the emissions covered by the ETS, 
irrespective of the location of the actual reduction” (ECN/PBL 2010: 125). 
11  I.e. the different accounting standards and reporting methods used by different participants in the EU ETS (see e.g. 
Lindquist & Goldberg 2010). 
12  Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), credits generated under the Clean Development Mechanism, can be used both by 
governments for compliance under the Kyoto Protocol and by installations covered by the EU ETS as a substitute for an 
EUA. A CER therefore is a multifaceted asset in that it can be surrendered for compliance under different trading regimes 
that are to a large extent interconnected. So-called double counting of CERs occurs when one CER, i.e. one tonne of CO2 
reduction generated by a project in a developing country, is used to offset more than one tonne of CO2 emissions by 
Kyoto signatories or EU ETS participants. This can happen when, intentionally or unintentionally, the administration of 
the CER transfer or surrender for compliance is not correctly executed. For instance, on 11 March 2010 the Hungarian 
government unintentionally caused a stir when it resold CERs that it had already used for compliance under the Kyoto 
Protocol to a Hungarian utility. The value of the transaction was around EUR 20 million. After further trade, the assets 
returned to the ETS. When it became clear that credits were in circulation that could not be used for compliance, the 
bidding on spot CERs collapsed. Following this, the EU ETS Registries Regulation was improved to prevent further 
incidents involving recycled CERs. The transaction log and large exchanges now automatically flag CERs that have 
already been surrendered for compliance by other parties (Kossoy & Ambrosi 2010). 
13  Carbon leakage is closely related to windfall profits. Assuming an elastic supply and a marginal cost increase for 
allowances, the demand elasticity determines the result. In the event of inelastic demand, prices will rise and enable 
windfalls. In the event of elastic demand, firms experience international competition and consequently a drop in 
production within the EU ETS area, and an increase in production (and carbon emissions) outside the EU ETS territory 
(carbon leakage). Carbon leakage refers to the relocation of emission-intensive parts of the economy to regions where 
emissions are not regulated, and a change in the trade balance of the EU.  
14  In terms of the national discussion, we did not notice a strong influence from environmental organizations. On the 
national level we observed political attention for windfall profits and the proposed building of two new coal-fired power 
plants. The latter issue is not really part of the ETS, but is closely related to it, as any specific energy mix obligation 
would influence the ETS. In the European political context, lobby organizations such as the European Climate 
Foundation and Sandbag (see Sandbag 2010) certainly influence the political process and provide some countervailing 
power to corporate rent-seeking.  
15  This analysis mainly holds for the large firms involved. Conditions might be different for small firms. One interviewee 
mentioned the issue of the cost-benefit outcome for small firms: transaction costs might exceed potential benefits. This 
27 
                                                                                                                                                        
seems to have been the case for a group of horticultural firms which intended to enter the ETS but ultimately decided not 
to do so. 
16  Carbon leakage is undesirable both from an economic and an environmental point of view and is successfully used as an 
argument by the European private sector and member states to lobby the European Commission to make far-reaching 
efforts to minimize the potentially distortional effect of the EU ETS on the economy. The EC (2010) issued an extensive 
and controversial list including sectors that are prone to carbon leakage and therefore receive a large part of their 
allowances free in Phase III. 
